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ABSTRACT
Irregular immigration arriving on small boats from the African continent has placed the 
Canary Islands at the center of the national and European political agenda regarding im-
migration. It has also converted the archipelago into an observatory where the connections 
between migration policies and human rights can be analyzed. One of the main argu-
ments of this article is that despite the archipelago’s long history of receiving immigrants 
and the presence of other groups of irregular migrants, what triggered the incorporation 
of immigration into the regional political agenda and political rhetoric was the fl ow of 
clandestine African immigrants at the end of the 1990s. The increased frequency with 
which these boats began to arrive on its shores in the fi rst half of 2006 has reignited and 
intensifi ed the debate on population, territory and identity in the archipelago.
   Keywords: 1. immigration policies, 2. borders, 3. ethnic identities and nationalism, 
4. Spain, 5. Canary Islands.
   
RESUMEN
La llegada de inmigración irregular en embarcaciones procedentes del cercano continen-
te africano a las Islas Canarias ha situado a este archipiélago en el centro de la agenda 
política española y europea sobre inmigración. También ha convertido a esta región en 
un buen observatorio para entender los vínculos entre políticas migratorias y derechos 
humanos. El propósito de este artículo es estudiar los vínculos entre la inmigración y la 
dinámica política en este contexto geográfi co. Uno de los principales argumentos será 
que, a pesar de su larga historia como contexto receptor y a la presencia de otros tipos 
de inmigración irregular, la intensifi cación de las llegadas desde el continente africano 
ha provocado la incorporación de la inmigración en la agenda política regional y en el 
discurso público. El aumento del fl ujo desde 2006 ha moldeado e intensifi cado el debate 
interno sobre la población, el territorio y la identidad.
   Palabras clave: 1. política migratoria, 2. fronteras, 3. identidades étnicas y naciona-
lismo, 4. España, 5. Islas Canarias.
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Over the past few years the Canary Islands has been transformed into 
Europe’s last frontier, a destination for numerous kinds of migratory fl ows 
and the landing point for irregular immigration arriving on precarious 
vessels from the nearby African continent. The aim of this article is to 
describe the intense relationships between this archipelago and inter-
national migration and the impact these movements have had on the 
extraordinarily complex internal politics of the islands where a sense of 
Canarian identity has emerged, raising concerns such as the fragility of the 
territory. But before discussing Canarian identity, a few moments should 
be spent on the migratory and political context of the archipelago.*
1. Introduction: the Gateway to Europe, Africa and America
The Canary Islands are located at the intersection between Europe, Africa 
and America, making it a hub for commerce and population fl ows between 
those continents. Because the archipelago is located on one of the main sea 
routes connecting Europe to America, its economy is closely tied to the 
Atlantic. The islands were colonized during the overseas expansion of Spain 
during the fi fteenth century and the fi rst few decades of the sixteenth cen-
tury. In later centuries they were populated by colonists from various areas 
of Europe who imported slaves to work in agriculture, livestock and sugar 
cane plantations (see Fernández-Armesto, 1982). Strong commercial ties 
with Great Britain and other European countries were developed through 
wine production, leading to the rise of the fi rst mercantile enclaves in the 
ports. While the native population was decimated by wars, disease and the 
slave trade, the islands were repopulated by European colonists, including 
merchants and missionaries, colonial civil servants and soldiers serving the 
Castilian Crown. The Canary Islands became one of the fi rst, closest and 
smallest of the “New Europes” that would soon be found in many parts of 
the world (Crosby, 1986). As a “new society”, the Canary Islands, as Gerard 
Bouchard has suggested in regard to other similar experiences, also had to 
appropriate a space previously settled by other people, establish a new social 
contract and loyalties, develop a new collective memory and imaginary, and 
demarcate and differentiate itself from the metropolis by negotiating a new 
relationship (Bouchard, 2003; Esteban Sánchez, 2006).
 * This work has been possible within the framework of the investigation project 
HUM2004-04562.
MI-12.indd   88 5/28/2007   2:35:47 PM
                  ESTEBAN-LÓPEZ SALA/BREAKING DOWN THE FAR SOUTHERN BORDER OF EUROPE   89
There are powerful, highly complex links between insular territories in 
general and the phenomenon of migration (Connell and King, 1999). 
Because the Canaries are located in the open expanse of the Atlantic, 
very near the African continent (only 100 kilometers from the coast of 
Morocco), in the past they became a crossroads for colonists, merchants, 
conquistadors and sailors. In recent decades, these islands have become 
the site of intense temporary and permanent internal and international 
immigration thanks to the archipelago’s pleasant climate, its economic 
vitality and the fact that it forms part of Europe’s political borders. This 
immigration is characterized by residential tourism and return migra-
tion, aspects that differentiate it from the kinds of migration seen in 
other parts of  Spain.
For centuries, much of Spanish emigration originated from this region, 
along with Galicia, Extremadura and Andalusia. In the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries,  Canarian migration to Uruguay, Venezuela and Cuba 
was one of the largest migratory fl ows originating from Spain. This fl ow 
created intense relations between the archipelago and Latin America, 
especially Venezuela (a country often referred to as the “eighth island” of 
the Canary Archipelago), and has also led to the large return migration of 
the offspring of Canarian immigrants going back to the islands today.
The twentieth century also saw considerable immigration to Spanish 
territories in Africa, a migration fl ow that is not very well known and 
has scarcely been studied. At fi rst this fl ow went to Equatorial Guinea 
and Morocco (to the enclaves of Sidi Ifni and Villa Cisneros) and sub-
sequently to the former Spanish colony of the Sahara, where immigrants 
worked in the army, construction and phosphate mines. The shorter 
distances, lower cost of the tickets and stable transportation allowed 
for temporary, circular and seasonal migrations and the maintenance of 
family ties (Domínguez and Guerra, 2004). Unlike immigration to Latin 
America, nearly all of this Spanish contingent returned to Spain.
Despite their tradition of emigration, the Canary Islands were also 
one of the fi rst Spanish regions to receive foreigners. Some of the old-
est communities established in the archipelago came from the Middle 
East and East Asia. The Islamic community in the Canaries dates from 
the beginning of the twentieth century when the fi rst Arab immigrants 
reached their shores. This was a unique type of migration within the 
Spanish panorama, comprising Syrians, Lebanese and Palestinians who 
were actually headed for the American continent. As they passed through 
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the island ports, some of them decided to stay and try their luck with 
the business opportunities offered by the archipelago and its unusual tax 
system (Abu-Tarbush, 2001). Fishing and maritime traffi c would also 
later lead to the establishment of small Japanese, Korean and Russian 
communities in Las Palmas, the islands’ main port.
Another unique ethnic community in Spain is the Canarian Sindhi 
Hindu community, mostly made up of immigrants from the province of 
Sind. The fi rst Sindhis settled in the islands along with small groups of 
Arab and Jewish merchants during the second half of the nineteenth cen-
tury and the beginning of the twentieth century. This group was attracted 
by the free port system established in the Canaries in 1852. Members of 
the commercial diaspora that spread out from Asia to the Middle East, 
the African continent, the Maghrebian countries and Gibraltar settled in 
this region, enticed by the business opportunities it offered (Markovits, 
2000; Falzon, 2004; Haller, 2003). After the partition of the Indian sub-
continent, family networks and the economic advantages of the Canarian 
tax system attracted new members to the community. This is a community 
whose size has remained stable at a few thousand and whose composi-
tion has remained homogenous while controlling various sectors of the 
Canarian economy for decades. Despite the years that have elapsed since 
then, this community still maintains its idiosyncrasy within the receptor 
society. Although it is not a large group in demographic terms, it remains 
a deeply infl uential community in the islands’ economic life.
Internal immigration caused by the transition from agrarian to indus-
trial society was mostly directed towards the central islands, Tenerife 
and Gran Canaria. This change occurred even later than in the Spanish 
mainland and today lifestyles combining agrarian and urban identities 
can still be observed in the archipelago. The fact that it has modernized 
more slowly than the rest of Spain is also evident in its slower demo-
graphic transition: due to higher birth rates the Canarian population 
has grown at a faster pace and has a younger population than the rest 
of Spain. Economic and social change in the Canary Islands is funda-
mentally linked to the development of the tourism industry, which has 
displaced traditional agrarian lifestyles. This process occurred only a few 
years before the political decentralization of Spain. After Franco’s death, 
Spain went from being one of the most centralized states in Europe 
to being one of the most decentralized as regional governments have 
acquired many areas of competence.
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After this brief description of the migratory history of the islands, the 
following sections will focus on the dynamics of recent immigration to 
the archipelago. This situation has transformed the Canaries into Europe’s 
new southern frontier, where residential fl ows from Northern and Eastern 
Europe merge with fl ows from Africa, returning Latin American immi-
grants and new sources of migratory fl ows. The remainder of the article 
will examine the political situation of this region over the past few years 
as well as the impact this social phenomenon has had on public discourse 
and regional politics. The irregular immigration arriving on small boats 
from the African continent has placed the Canary Islands at the center of 
the national and European political agenda regarding immigration. It has 
also converted the archipelago into an observatory where the connections 
between migration policies and human rights can be analyzed.
One of the main arguments of this article is that despite the archi-
pelago’s long history of receiving immigrants and the presence of other 
groups of irregular migrants, what triggered the incorporation of im-
migration into the regional political agenda was the fl ow of clandestine 
African immigrants at the end of the 1990s. The increased frequency 
with which these boats began to arrive on its shores in the fi rst half 
of 2006 has reignited and intensifi ed the debate. The response of the 
Spanish government has been to focus on fi ghting illegal immigration, 
monitoring its territorial waters and developing procedures to receive 
these irregular migrants. The regional administration has also begun 
demanding more resources and authority in precisely these areas. These 
demands are largely based on the concept of territoriality, the hecho 
diferencial canario (the belief that the Canary Islands are a distinct and 
unique society) and the defense of Canarian identity.
2. The Canaries within the Spanish Migratory Puzzle
Changes in the migratory model in the Canary Islands are closely linked 
to the development of a new socio-economic model based primarily 
on tourism during the 1970s. The growth of mass tourism has had an 
enormous impact on the dynamics of production and the economy, as 
well as welfare levels. Development during the last few decades has also 
increased job creation, particularly in the service sector and construction. 
This contributed fi rst to the deceleration and subsequently the end of 
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Canarian emigration to foreign countries. This halt to emigration has 
been coupled with an increase in return migration from the 1990s to 
the present, mostly by Canarians who resided in Venezuela and their 
offspring due to the political crisis in that country. One should not forget 
that emigration from the Canary Islands to Venezuela continued until 
the 1980s. The return of Canarian emigrants therefore began a decade 
after the return migration of Spaniards that had migrated to Northern 
European countries. The migratory transformation of the Canary Islands 
is also characterized by the increase in arrivals from foreign countries, 
especially from Europe, Africa and Latin America (Godenau and Arteaga, 
2003; Domínguez, 1996), but also from other Spanish regions.
The increase in immigration to the Canaries coincides with changes 
in Spain. Spain began receiving international population fl ows for the 
fi rst time in its recent history in the mid-1980s along with neighboring 
Southern European countries and the rate of these arrivals has grown 
rapidly. In 1986 there were 250,000 foreign residents in Spain, whereas 
today that number is approximately three million, excluding the unde-
termined number that do not appear on offi cial registers. During the 
1990s, Morocco was the principle source of migration to Spain. However, 
the increase in fl ows from Latin America and certain Eastern European 
countries has diversifi ed the current composition of these migrations. To-
day over 500,000 Moroccan citizens reside in Spain, along with 600,000 
Ecuadorians and Columbians and nearly 250,000 Romanians.
Although a common perception in the Canaries is that this region is 
the main migratory destination of Spain, from 2001-2005 it actually 
ranked 5th behind Madrid, Catalonia, Andalusia and Valencia. More 
than 160,000 aliens reside in its territory, accounting for approximately 
8% of the total immigrant population of two million (a percentage 
similar to that of Spain). However, during the past decade, immigra-
tion to Spain as a whole has been much greater than to the Canaries. 
Whereas in 1996 10.5% of the total immigrant population in Spain 
resided in the archipelago, this percentage has descended year after year 
until reaching its current level of 5.9%.1
In contrast with other receptor countries in Central and Northern Europe, 
migration to Southern Europe, which includes Italy, Portugal and Greece, 
 1 According to the Annual Statistics on Aliens (2000-2003). Ministry of Labor 
and Social Affairs and the Permanent Immigration Observatory, Secretary of Emi-
gration and Immigration (2004 and 2005).
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contains high levels of retirement migrations. Just as in other areas on the 
Spanish coast, the archipelago has a large community of immigrants from 
the various European Union member states. Almost twelve million tour-
ists visit the islands every year, a portion of whom have become residential 
immigrants. The British and German communities are the largest and have 
settled mainly on the islands of Tenerife, Gran Canaria and Lanzarote. This 
international retirement immigration follows the “New Florida” migratory 
model,2 made up mostly of pensioners, early retirees, permanent and long-
term temporary residents found largely in tourist areas. Over the past few 
years, young adults from Great Britain and other nationalities have settled 
in the islands to work in companies that provide services for tourists and 
established European communities, such as satellite TV companies, health 
centers and alternative therapies, real estate agencies, fi nancial services 
companies, rural and green tourism agencies, etc.3
The composition of the foreign population residing in the islands 
has changed since the mid 1990s, following a similar pattern to that of 
the rest of Spain. Until 1996 Europeans accounted for nearly 70% of 
the immigrant population, followed by Latin Americans (13.5%) and 
Asians (10.2%). Over the past decade, the percentage of Europeans has 
dropped considerably (43% in 2005), while the African population has 
grown and stabilized since 2000 (see Ferrer, Betancor and Farsi, 2005; 
Díaz Hernández, 2005) and the Latin American population has grown 
sharply, now constituting the second largest community after Europeans 
(López Sala, 2005; López Sala and Esteban, 2004, 2006).
3. Floating to Europe
Irregular immigration arriving on small boats from different parts of 
the African continent is one of the defi ning characteristics of migrations 
to Spain. The dynamic strategies and migratory routes used by immi-
grants trying to enter Spain throughout the last decade have continually 
 2 “The New Florida migratory model is a type of residential immigration model 
where elderly residents predominate, similar to the situation in the state of Florida 
in the United States where the main reason for migration is the search for leisure 
and rest in the US Sun Belt. It is a residential model based on consumption rather 
than on production.” (Salvá, 2002).
 3 These are called migrant tourist-workers, invisible workers in the service sector 
(Bott, 2004).
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adapted to the measures implemented by the Spanish authorities to 
control their borders. Border control has concentrated on monitoring 
three entrance points: the Spanish enclaves in Africa, Ceuta and Melilla 
(the oldest entrance point for illegal immigration), the Straits of Gibral-
tar, and the waters separating the Canary Archipelago from the coast 
of Africa (the prevailing route in 2006). Whenever control over one of 
these access points is tightened, immigrants implement new strategies 
and use new routes; this adaptability is illustrated by the way the routes 
were channeled to the Canaries after control was increased in Ceuta 
and Melilla and the western coasts of Morocco in 2005.
In the 1980s, the Strait of Gibraltar became a migratory route, fi rst 
to the nearby coasts of Cadiz (close to Gibraltar and only 14 kilome-
ters away from Morocco) and subsequently, after the implementation 
of SIVE4 (an electronic surveillance and boat interception system), to 
more distant Andalusian coastal provinces. The small, shallow fi shing 
boats known as pateras were initially only used by adult Moroccan 
immigrants to make the crossing, but the readmission agreements 
Spain signed with Morocco have led to more minors and sub-Saharan 
Africans being among the occupants since they are not affected by 
these agreements. The increased use of the Canarian route during the 
fi rst few years of this decade is a response to greater surveillance of the 
Straits of Gibraltar and the diffi culty of entering through Ceuta and 
Melilla where fences have gradually been erected around both cities and 
electronic surveillance is used.
For years, crossing over to the Canaries by sea has marked the end 
of a protracted land journey for sub-Saharan Africans. These routes 
originate thousands of kilometers away in the interior of the African 
continent, coming together in Mali and Niger. From there, migrants 
cross the Saharan desert to reach Algeria before crossing its northern 
border into Morocco. Once in Morocco the routes to Spain branch out. 
 4 SIVE is a high-tech electronic surveillance and interception system used by the 
Spanish Civil Guard to monitor the Spanish coast. It was originally implemented 
in the Straits of Gibraltar and in 2001 on the Andalusian coast, in the province 
of Cadiz; it has also been gradually implemented in other areas of Andalusia and 
the coasts of the Canaries. This system combines three elements: a) radar stations 
distributed along the coast, b) control centers where specialized agents can control 
the movement of the cameras and radars scattered along the coast and c) “inter-
ception units” (patrol boats, helicopters and vehicles) that receive orders from the 
control center. 
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The northern route heads toward Rabat and Tetuan where migrants 
attempt to cross the Straits of Gibraltar or enter Spain through Ceuta 
and Melilla. The southern route departs from northern Moroccan cities 
and once again takes migrants on a 1,000 kilometer journey south to 
the old Spanish Saharan territories that today make up the southern 
coast of Morocco. From there they took boats to the Canary Islands, 
at which point the sub-Saharan emigrants would have completed an 
arduous, circuitous route (Barrios et al., 2002; Lorenzo Villar, 2004). 
The direct land route from sub-Saharan Africa to southern Morocco has 
not been used for migration because it crosses an extremely dangerous 
area that is heavily patrolled, militarized and full of land mines due to 
the confl ict over the Sahara between Moroccan and Polisario Fronts.
Many of the boats that have arrived in the Canaries over the past few 
years were launched from the area surrounding Tarfaya and El Aaiun in 
southern Morocco. Although this ocean voyage is long and diffi cult, it 
is relatively easy to accomplish without knowing much about naviga-
tion because of the favorable currents and the ease of maintaining the 
boat’s bearings; once the African coast is no longer visible the coast of 
the island of Fuerteventura (the easternmost island in the Canarian 
archipelago) comes into view, at a distance of 100 km.5
In 2004 and 2005, the number of boats arriving via the Canarian 
route from the Sahara decreased for two reasons: the Moroccan authori-
ties increased patrols along their western coast as a result of improved 
diplomatic relations with the new socialist government in Spain and 
also because it became more diffi cult to complete this route undetected 
due to the expansion of SIVE along much of the archipelago’s coast. 
However, since 2005, the strategies used to enter Spain from Morocco 
have once again adapted to the new situation. Pateras began arriving at 
the islands furthest away from the African coast, such as Gran Canaria 
and Tenerife, where SIVE has not yet been implemented. This means that 
the routes are now much longer since these boats have to reach islands 
that are more than 300 km from the southern coast of Morocco.
The increased diffi culties in crossing over from Morocco have led 
sub-Saharan Africans wishing to reach the European Union by sea to 
launch their boats further south. These new departure points are located 
in Mauritania and Senegal and even further south. This shortens the 
 5 In the SIVE control centers hundreds of the outboard motors used in the cross-
ings are stored as legal evidence. The boats themselves are regularly destroyed.
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land journey while drastically lengthening the sea voyage which can last 
up to fi ve days. The resources used in this new route are also different. 
The new boats arriving on the Canarian coasts are called cayucos, boats 
once used by fi shermen in Senegal and Mauritania. They are built out 
of wood and glass fi ber, painted in bright colors and are much more 
solid, longer and most importantly, deeper than the pateras used to cross 
the Straits of Gibraltar. These boats are capable of carrying dozens of 
passengers and completing much longer sea voyages.
Over the last few months, the number of boats arriving in the archipelago 
has increased dramatically,6 particularly in Tenerife. Approximately 10,000 
people arrived in cayucos during the fi rst fi ve months of 2006. Arrivals 
were especially intense in May due to improved weather conditions. In the 
second weekend of May alone, 900 people reached the islands.7 There is 
reason to believe that a large percentage of migrants that take this journey 
die in transit. Despite the diffi culty of quantifying this tragedy, if we con-
sider the number of dead bodies washed up on the coasts, reports by the 
Red Cross and the Red Crescent and the testimony of both the migrants 
that do manage to arrive and the family members of the disappeared, 
this number may be as high as several thousand in the last few months; a 
terrible, largely unreported tragedy. This dramatic increase has created an 
unprecedented humanitarian crisis in the archipelago and severely tested 
all the institutions and civil society involved in this area. In addition, it has 
shed light on the opinion of Canarian society, sparked a diplomatic blitz by 
the Spanish government with the countries where these fl ows originate and 
in the European Union, altered relations between central government and 
the autonomous government of the Canary Islands and had a tremendous 
impact on the national political agenda.
In an attempt to resolve this crisis, the Spanish government has fo-
cused on three groups of initiatives. First of all, government has signed 
new readmission agreements, improved bilateral cooperation in border 
control, signifi cantly increased development and humanitarian aid and 
improved multilateral cooperation with the countries of origin through 
 6 In May 2005 security forces intercepted 218 immigrants in the Canaries. In 
May 2006, they intercepted 4,792, a twenty-fold increase.
 7 The number of arrivals has continued to increase throughout 2006, with a 
surge during the summer due to the good maritime conditions. The total number 
of arrivals at the end of the year surpassed 30,000 people according to the data 
provided by the Ministry of the Interior (Home Office) and the Government 
Delegation in the islands. 
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the enactment of the new Action Plan for sub-Saharan Africa (which 
will open consulates in various sub-Saharan countries in which Spain 
currently has a minimal presence). For the fi rst time in the history of 
Spanish diplomacy Africa has become a priority.
One of the objectives of the Action Plan for sub-Saharan Africa or Africa 
Plan is to promote cooperation with the countries of origin and transit in 
order to regulate migratory fl ows and combat illegal people smuggling. 
The plan includes internal actions such as reinforcing border controls, 
obtaining information on the routes used by illegal immigration networks, 
reducing the red tape involved in the deportation process and fostering 
the social integration of migrants that have already arrived in Spain. These 
multilateral initiatives have focused on fostering cooperation between 
Europe and Africa on migratory issues and increasing the number of 
agreements adopted during the Ministerial Euro-African Conference 
on Migration and Development held in Rabat in July 2006. Bilateral 
measures include a series of cooperation agreements with priority coun-
tries8 on migration and readmission together with an increased Spanish 
diplomatic presence in the area (see Africa Plan, 2006). These initiatives 
were crucial to the diplomatic management of the crisis caused when the 
vessels Marine I and Happy Day were detained early in 2007.
The second group of initiatives is aimed at monitoring the waters that 
separate the African continent from the Canary Islands in conjunction with 
the European Union. To accomplish this, eight EU member states will partici-
pate in a permanent naval and aerial patrol system that will guard the coasts 
of Morocco, Mauritania, Senegal and Cape Verde. The EU border control 
agency will also set up a European center for regional border control in the 
Canaries. During the fi rst half of 2006, initiatives focused on bolstering the 
activity of FRONTEX (the European Agency for the Management of Opera-
tional Cooperation and the External Borders of the Member States of the 
European Union) in the region and since July 2006, they have included the 
development of joint operations between various European Union member 
states, known as the Hera I, Hera II and, more recently, Hera III operations. 
The fi rst of these operations, carried out from July until October 2006, 
focused on interviewing irregular immigrants arriving in the Canaries on 
boats in order to fi nd out if their crossings were facilitated by smugglers. The 
 8 These countries include Senegal, Mali, Ghana, Cameroon, the Ivory Coast, 
Cape Verde, Guinea-Conakry and Gambia. Previous agreements already existed 
with Nigeria and Guinea-Bissau.
MI-12.indd   97 5/28/2007   2:35:51 PM
        98  MIGRACIONES INTERNACIONALES, VOL. 4, NÚM. 1, ENERO-JUNIO DE 2007
objective of Hera II, which lasted until the middle of December 2006, was 
to exhaustively patrol the water separating the Canary Archipelago from the 
western coast of Africa and, when necessary, to intercept vessels in the ter-
ritorial waters of third countries, thus allowing illegal migrants to be swiftly 
returned to their point of departure. The last operation, implemented in the 
middle of last February (2005), includes both objectives. The increase in 
fl ows has consolidated the externalization of border control as a priority for 
the European Union, as evinced by the text of the European Commission’s 
November 2006 Communication, Reinforcing the Management of The Euro-
pean Union’s Southern Maritime Borders.9
The third group of initiatives focuses on providing urgent medical and 
legal assistance for the irregular immigrants arriving in the archipelago on 
boats and their transfer to other Spanish provinces.
4. Final destination, Europe (with stopovers in the Caribbean
and Africa): the rise of Canarian nationalism
The administrative and political situation in the Canaries is extremely 
complex due to the high level of political decentralization in Spain, their 
insularity and the fact that the regional government is dominated by a 
nationalist party with unusual characteristics. As we shall see, these traits 
have had a signifi cant impact on the recent immigration debate.
The current political system in Spain was established during the 
democratic transition period initiated after the death of Franco in 
1975. The Spanish Constitution of 1978 implemented a highly 
decentralized political system based on autonomous communities. 
These autonomous communities were legally constituted as territo-
rial entities endowed with legislative autonomy through their own 
parliaments and extensive executive powers. The new structure of 
the Spanish state acknowledged and  ensured that the nationalities 
and regions that constitute it have the right to autonomy (Aja, 2003; 
González Trevijano, 1998; Loughlin, 2001). In the following years, 
this led to the creation of 17 autonomous communities and two au-
tonomous cities (Ceuta and Melilla) once their statutes of autonomy10 
 9 COM (2006) 733 final, Brussels, 30.11. 2006.
10 Nominally, a statute of autonomy is a law hierarchically located below the 
constitution of a country, and above any other form of legislation. This legislative 
corpus confers a degree of autonomy on a sub-national unit, and the articles usually 
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(estatutos de autonomía) were approved. Decentralization occurred 
more quickly in the cases of the historical nationalities (Catalonia, 
the Basque Country, Galicia and Andalusia) whose uniqueness had 
been acknowledged by statutes enacted before Franco’s military coup 
in 1936.11 The rest of the autonomous communities, including the 
Canaries, whose fi rst statute was enacted in 1982, were forced to ac-
cept statutes that granted them less authority at fi rst, although they 
did attain certain key competences such as the administration of 
education, health services and universities.12
Within the Spanish legal system the Canary Islands also has a special 
economic regime due to their distinctiveness, insularity and remoteness 
from the Spanish mainland. This economic regime began centuries ago 
with the creation of free ports and was maintained during Franco’s dic-
tatorship, despite the fact that it was one of the most centralized regimes 
in Europe at the time (López Aguilar, 1998). The special condition 
of the Canaries has been consolidated during the democratic period 
through Article 138 of the Spanish Constitution (which guarantees the 
principle of solidarity, with special attention being paid to insularity), 
the Statute of Autonomy of the Canary Islands and the application of 
the Canary Islands Economic and Fiscal Regime (REF) which has regu-
lated special conditions for investments and taxes in this region since 
1994. The European Union has also acknowledged their uniqueness by 
including the Canaries among the ultra-peripheral European regions,13 
mimic the form of a constitution, establishing the organization of an autonomous 
government, electoral rules, the distribution of competences between different 
levels of governance and other regional-specific provisions, such as the protection 
of cultural or linguistic realities.
11 The military coup was plotted in Santa Cruz de Tenerife, where General Franco 
had been stationed as Commander General of the Canary Islands after he was 
dismissed as Head of the General Staff  when the Popular Front (Frente Popular) of 
Manuel Azaña came to power. From the very beginning of the Spanish Civil war, 
the Canaries would form part of the territory under “nationalist” control. Ironi-
cally, the route Franco took to Morocco to take command of the troops that had 
revolted in the Spanish Protectorate of Morocco is very similar to the one used by 
many immigrants, but in the opposite direction
12 The new socialist government in power since the spring of 2004 has begun to 
increase this decentralization by promoting new statutes of autonomy. 
13 The rest of the ultra-peripheral European regions are Guadalupe, Martinique, 
Guyana and Reunion, belonging to France, and the Azores and Madeira, belong-
ing to Portugal.
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which allows for special actions regarding European structural funds 
and policies, particularly economic ones.14
The democratic political situation of this autonomous community has 
been characterized by fragmented, unstable coalitions in the regional 
government, despite the fact that for more than a decade it has been 
governed by the Canarian Coalition (Coalición Canaria), a party that has 
taken up the nationalist banner by grouping together a variety of factions 
seeking greater autonomy and even independence from Spain.
Comparatively speaking, Canarian nationalism is relatively recent, less 
defi ned and has less scope than the other peripheral nationalisms in Spain. 
The concept of nationalism emerged relatively late in the islands and at fi rst 
had little socio-political impact. For example, the explosion of nationalisms 
in the Basque Country and Catalonia at the end of the 19th Century barely 
caused a ripple in the archipelago. The fi rst chapter of Canarian nationalism 
took place among emigrants in Venezuela around the ambiguous fi gure of 
Secundino Delgado and the magazine El Guanche (the term used for na-
tives of the islands). The second chapter occurred in Cuba, resulting in the 
creation of the fi rst Canarian nationalist party in 1924, which disappeared 
only three years later. In the past, Canarian nationalism was known for its 
weak arguments, marginality (since it was largely tied to emigration), and 
lack of sustained, stable leadership, as well as for being sporadic, disperse and 
organizationally fragmented (Hernández Bravo, 1999). This early version 
of nationalism sought to incorporate the Canary Islands into the struggles 
of former Spanish colonies in Latin America, in particular by espousing an 
affi nity with Caribbean nations based on the fact that Canarian emigration 
had mostly targeted that region.15
14 In Spain, the Canary Islands are considered unique because of their insular-
ity, the fact that they are an archipelago and their remoteness from the Spanish 
mainland and the European continent. This geographic isolation has had historical 
implications affecting the identity of the islands, and early on was legally acknowl-
edged through the Canary Islands Economic and Fiscal Regime (REF), among other 
legal measures. The central government, through the Constitution and the Statute 
of Autonomy of the Canary Islands, has also given the region a great deal of latitude 
to negotiate the distribution of competences (see López Aguilar, García Andrade, 
Carballo Armas, Rodríguez Drincourt and Moreno Almeida, 2001).
15 Consequently, the term still used to refer disparagingly to Spaniards from the main-
land –as well as the inhabitants of the Balearic Islands- is “godos”, coined in Venezuela 
during the fight for independence. Furthermore, amongst the many nationalisms that 
compete in today’s Spain, only the Canarian nationalism uses the term “Peninsular” in 
its political rhetoric, which has a long tradition in Latin American history.
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During the next phase of Canarian nationalism, the Movement for 
Independence and Self-Rule of the Canary Archipelago (MPAIAC) led by 
Antonio Cubillo emerged in opposition to the Francoist regime. This 
movement established a radical separatist political party with a pro-in-
digenous, pro-African platform that sought recognition as a national 
liberation movement from the Organization of African Unity, based on 
the idea that the original inhabitants of the island were North African. 
Inspired by neo-colonial African struggles and the ideas of Frantz Fanon, 
this independence party engaged in a few minor terrorist bombings.16 
For all intents and purposes, this organization has disappeared although 
other radical nationalist parties have inherited its ideology.
With the advent of democracy and Spain’s admission into the European 
Community, a new political situation emerged that led to the diversifi ca-
tion of nationalist ideology, ranging from pro-independence and self-rule to 
pro-autonomy and center-right and center-left regionalism. There are three 
reasons that help explain why Canarian Coalition was successful in launch-
ing a new nationalist party in 1993 and why it has managed to maintain 
power in the regional government ever since. First of all, it incorporates 
many of the nationalists who were disappointed by the failure of the pro-
independence nationalisms linked to Latin America and Africa and who 
have adapted to a new reality more in line with the thinking of the rest of 
the population who have never seen an advantage to direct confrontation 
and a hypothetical exit from Europe which would entail the loss of vast 
subsidies. Secondly, it provides an operating base for traditional oligarchies 
linked to tourism, construction and commerce that had been deprived of 
political representation in Madrid after the fall of Franco’s regime and the 
failure of center-right parties. Thirdly, following the lead of Basque and 
Catalan nationalisms, it has gained control of the regional government’s 
powerful political and economic institutions. The groups included in the 
Canarian Coalition are extraordinarily heterogeneous, with political interests 
covering a broad range of ideologies and classes. The disparate interests of 
these nationalists, communists and conservatives are only able to coexist 
thanks to the control and distribution of autonomic institutions and local 
16 The last of these terrorist attacks, in March 1977, had tragic consequences. 
Various airplanes had to be diverted from Las Palmas Airport to a small airport in 
Tenerife that was not prepared to deal with so much traffic. Two jumbo jets filled 
with tourists collided while maneuvering on the runways on an extremely foggy 
day, leading to the worst air traffic disaster in history.
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power networks based on a system of patronage. In other words, by redis-
tributing the enormous resources of the regional and local administration, 
this system of patronage consolidates a constituency that is fragmented in 
terms of social and geographic interests. In this situation, a vague, nebulous 
nationalism provides a veneer of legitimacy for its actions and unity within 
its organization without creating over-rigid dogmas.
For all its talk of national unity, the Canarian Coalition has failed to over-
come traditional insular rivalries or the distrust between the various political 
and economic groups within the party. This is perfectly illustrated by the 
long-standing dispute between the interests of the two main islands, Tenerife 
and Gran Canaria, which has made it impossible to fi x a single capital for the 
region and, as a consequence, has led to numerous redundancies between 
administrative institutions. Despite the efforts of the executive branch of 
the Canarian government, regional politics is characterized by the powerful 
centrifugal tendency common in archipelagic systems (La Flamme, 1983).
In contrast to the belligerence of Catalan and Basque nationalists, the 
Canarian Coalition has adopted a non-confrontational approach in national 
politics, supporting the party in power in different legislatures. In this way, 
it has served as a swing party in the creation of alliances and the adoption 
of legislation in return for the patronage of central government.
Conversely, at the regional level this party has managed to maintain a public 
discourse that demands recognition of the differences between the Canaries 
and the rest of Spain. Most of the population is satisfi ed with this national-
ism since it acknowledges the hecho diferencial canario while side-stepping the 
highly complex geo-political issue of independence. Instead, it favors a bi-
continental or tri-continental position, in which direct relations with Europe 
play a key role in separating it from riskier alternatives while reserving a role for 
itself that marginalizes Spain. In regional politics, it depicts itself as somewhat 
of a victim of central government while maintaining the simple yet effective 
message that everything that has been accomplished for the community is 
the result of their hard work, while all the problems in the Canaries are due to 
central government. Canarian Coalition has become one of the most effective 
tools in the archipelago in the creation of a new nationalism with conservative, 
and nativist tendencies. Because the Canary Islands lack traditional cultural 
anchors such as a distinct language17 of their own, this nationalism has begun 
creating and codifying its own cultural catalog derived from its not too distant 
17 Although Canarian Spanish can be distinguished from mainland Spanish by 
its accent and certain popular lexical contributions (or vocabulary) from various 
sources, this is not a sufficient basis on which to establish a national identity.
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agrarian past. It achieves this by combining and exalting various elements 
drawn from the traditions of different islands while constantly referring to its 
own identity (supposedly the result of a unique ethno-cultural mix derived 
from the original Guanche bedrock and the contributions of Europeans and 
Latin Americans over fi ve centuries). This discourse simultaneously serves 
to create a unique Canarian identity and defend it from centrifugal insular 
tendencies and the rootless cosmopolitanism of the tourist. It also seeks to 
create barriers to protect itself from the threat of an immigrant invasion and 
to emphasize the uniqueness of the Canaries as means of protecting themselves 
from being absorbed into the whole of Spain.
Thanks to the control of the Canarian government’s television networks 
and the cultural apparatus of the municipalities and inter-island councils, the 
social imaginary surrounding the uniqueness of the Canarian identity has 
easily taken hold of a population far removed from the Spanish mainland. 
Furthermore, the claustrophilia of the nationalist imaginary has cast the Other 
as a threat to the fragility of Canarian territory. This is an extremely complex 
otherness which, in its most extreme versions, not only includes immigrants 
from the Third World but also Europeans, mainland Spaniards and even 
Canarians from other islands. The immediate need to defend the territory 
has obviated the diffi culty of reaching a consensus over a highly problematic 
national narrative. The political minimalism of Canarian nationalism serves 
as a perfect counterbalance to this extremely effective social closure. 
5. Defending the Imaginary:
immigration and politics in the Canaries
Immigration entered the regional political agenda at the end of the 1990s, 
just a few years after this occurred in the rest of Spain. At that time, a 
regional policy on immigration began to be developed which led to the 
creation of specifi c institutional agencies, while various sectors of Canarian 
society adopted different positions on how to deal with this new situation. 
The following analysis will focus on the administration and claims of the 
main parties represented in the Canarian Parliament.
Other Spanish autonomous communities with strong nationalist 
sentiments have used the hecho diferencial and their cultural identity as 
political arguments to express their position on immigration, especially 
in Catalonia with regard to Muslim immigration in that region. Both 
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Catalonia and the Canaries have been demanding the transfer of addi-
tional jurisdiction for dealing with migration, such as the control over 
the amount of immigration and the selection of immigrants. These de-
mands have been signifi cantly weaker in Galicia and the Basque Country 
due to the limited amount of immigration these regions receive. 
In addition, the uniqueness of the Canaries and the fragility of its territory 
have been a key argument in the debate on migratory policy. For much of 
the political class and the Canarian population, this argument justifi es the 
need to enact special measures. Long before the arrival of Latin American 
and African immigration, a cloistered mentality became evident during 
negotiations over the archipelago’s special status with the European Com-
munity during the 1980s. In 1984 the Canarian Parliament proposed a bill 
(that was never passed) seeking to establish a transition period of ten years 
on the issue of free movement (see Comité de Expertos, 2003).
Ever since, there have been repeated attempts to pass a residence law in the 
Canaries that would restrict foreigners and Spanish citizens from other au-
tonomous communities from settling in this region because, as the argument 
goes, the territory is unable to  cope with the rate of population growth and 
economic exploitation that has occurred over the last few decades. Despite 
the fact that the Canaries are not the most densely populated Spanish region, 
Canarian public opinion strongly believes that the islands are over-developed 
and that population growth is out of control. The supposed link between 
population growth and the economy has been the subject of a number of 
opinions published by the Canary Islands Economic and Social Council and 
has also been discussed at length in the local press (see Comité de Expertos, 
2003; Dictamen Consejo Económico y Social de Canarias 1/2004, 2004; 
Zapata and Godenau, 2005).18 The notion of the territory’s “carrying capacity” 
has been widely used in this debate, as opposed to the “reception capacity” 
used in the national debate. This proposal has been submitted in a climate 
where urban growth has been increasingly identifi ed as unsustainable and 
irregular immigration is believed to have a negative impact on tourism.
18 Limiting growth in the archipelago’s population was still one of the core issues of 
the political debate leading up to the regional elections of May 2007. Paulino Rivero, 
the Canarian Coalition’s presidential candidate for the government of the autonomous 
community, has declared on numerous occasions that one of the main objectives of his 
government will be to implement measures to contain population growth. The candidate 
has insisted that alliances between his government and other parties would be contingent 
on their acceptance of his proposal on population. These statements have been published 
in the regional press and can be consulted on the Canarian Coalition’s website.
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This residence law debate was once again in the spotlight prior to the 
2003 regional elections. The government of the autonomous commu-
nity, controlled by the Canarian Coalition, even created a committee of 
experts to study the issue,19 but they concluded that such a law would 
violate the Spanish Constitution and the right to free movement pro-
tected by the European Union. Despite all this, the debate remains part 
of the regional political agenda, and has even gained prominence once 
again as a result of the upcoming reform of the statute of autonomy. 
The issue of controlling population growth and creating a residence law 
also reappeared during one of the periods that saw a dramatic increase in the 
number of irregular immigrants arriving in Tenerife. At the end of October 
2006 a protest organized by the Confederation of Residents’ Associations 
and the Canarian Identity group (Identidad Canaria) was held in the island’s 
capital under the slogan “Enough’s enough, there’s no more space”, which was 
attended by the CCN and PNC nationalist parties. This protest, which was also 
attended by the radical extreme right group National Democracy (Democracia 
Nacional), stirred up a great deal of controversy and was decried as racist and 
xenophobic by a large portion of Canarian society since it echoed the slogans 
of  the Spanish ultra-right.20 This controversy has caused the Canarian Coali-
tion to temporarily revise its political strategy by avoiding all discussion of 
a residence law, although they continue to promote issues such as limiting 
population growth and increasing the regional government’s authority over 
alien residents as priorities of their political agenda.
Since the mid 1990s, on a number of occasions, the two main national 
parties, the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) and the People’s Party (PP), have 
been minority partners in regional governments with Canarian Coalition. 
These parties have reacted differently to the proposed residence law. The PP 
(incorporated into the European People’s Party) believes in a strong central 
government and has openly opposed such a law. However, the Canarian PSOE 
has been less decisive. The Socialist Party has a federal structure that is open to 
different sensibilities and recognizes that there are different kinds of problems in 
the various autonomous communities. This has led the Canarian PSOE to adopt 
an erratic, ambiguous position on the residence law, particularly in municipal 
governments, which changes according to political circumstances.
19 Official Bulletin of the Canary Islands No. 132 and 133, October 7, 2002.
20 Among the slogans chanted were: “Enact a residence law now”, “Canarians, 
fight for your land”, “The island is sinking, there’s no more space”, “130,000 on 
welfare” or “Stop the invasion”.
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Beyond enacting a controversial residence law as a defi nitive solution to 
the threat that immigration poses to this fragile territory, an immediate 
compromise action is the transfer of sub-Saharan immigrants that arrive 
by boat to other autonomous communities. This solution is a result of the 
good relations the Canarian Coalition has always maintained with Madrid, 
regardless of which party is in power. The application of this “redistribution 
policy” explains why very few of the irregular immigrants that arrive by boat 
end up settling in the region. But applying the principle of solidarity at a 
national level has also meant that for the fi rst time the different islands have 
had to admit immigrants that arrived in other islands in the archipelago. 
At the beginning of this decade the redistribution to other regions of Spain 
of irregular immigrants who arrived in the archipelago and who could not 
be repatriated was carried out informally. However, since 2005, this has 
become a routine measure thanks to the agreements reached between the 
central and regional governments through the Canaries-State Sub-com-
mission. This has also been the policy established since the middle of last 
year regarding non-accompanied alien minors, as can be seen in the data 
provided by the Government Delegation in the archipelago.
In keeping with its general politics, the Canarian PP proposes to stop ir-
regular immigration by exhaustively patrolling the borders; it also opposes 
any legal amnesties for immigrants since it believes that this will only attract 
more irregular immigrants to Spain. The Canarian PSOE defends the actions 
the current Socialist government in Madrid has taken to resolve this crisis; 
national government has concentrated on effi ciently controlling fl ows, 
protecting the human rights of migrants and increasing cooperation with 
the countries of origin through the Africa Plan described earlier.
The Canarian Coalition has demanded increased vigilance of the waters 
separating the archipelago from the nearby African continent, appealing 
to the government in Madrid and the European Union to intervene on 
this issue. During the crisis that occurred in May 2006 it was agreed (with 
the support of the Canarian Coalition and PP) to ask the Spanish navy to 
patrol these waters and to send immigrants found on the high seas back to 
their countries. At the behest of PSOE, they also requested the creation of 
an extraordinary European fund to deal with the humanitarian crises these 
fl ows create in European Union member states. The Canarian Coalition has 
defended its right to negotiate directly with the European Union on these 
issues and also wants to take part in discussions on developing cooperation 
with the African continent. Additional regional jurisdiction is included in 
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the draft of the next autonomy statute that is currently being negotiated while 
authority over ports and Canarian territorial waters is also being demanded 
in order to control irregular immigration. The Canarian government has also 
called for the power to regulate the internal job market through control over 
issuing residence and work permits. And lastly, it has taken advantage of the 
current situation to change the offi cial Canarian fl ag to a traditional Canarian 
nationalist fl ag and to request jurisdiction over police-related matters.
Certain members of the Canarian Coalition and left-wing nationalist 
parties (minority parties but with an effective populist message) have 
adopted even more extreme positions. They want to prohibit or severely 
limit the right of EU residents, non-EU immigrants and even Spanish 
citizens from other autonomous communities to settle in the territory 
and obtain access to the regional labor market. This demand is based on 
the argument that external fl ows alter and threaten Canarian identity and 
that the local job market should be reserved for Canarians. Many of these 
fl ows are seen as mechanisms that allow globalization to penetrate the 
territory and as forms of colonial domination by central government.
The region’s political agenda unquestionably refl ects the priorities and 
the nativist social imaginary created by Canarian Coalition. Nationalism 
and migration have often gone hand-in-hand, but Canarian nationalism 
has been reversed evolving from a nationalism created by emigrants to 
a nationalism whose message and imaginary are based on reactionary 
responses to all forms of immigration. For the time being, issues such as 
Canarian distinctiveness, the need to protect the cultural identity of the 
islands and the fragility of their geographic location next to the African 
continent have managed to marginalize other important considerations 
such as human rights and the social integration of immigrants reaching 
the “far southern border of Europe”.
The escalation of irregular immigration flows to the Canary Islands 
has heated up the already impassioned internal debate on population, 
territory and identity in this region. The issues of immigration and 
nationalism have become intimately linked in the public sphere and 
this marriage will significantly shape future public policy through 
agreements reached by the government after the upcoming regional 
elections. In the medium term, the combination of political forces 
in the regional government, new jurisdiction over residence and 
work permits for aliens in the reformed statute of autonomy and 
increased vigilance over migratory routes from the African continent 
MI-12.indd   107 5/28/2007   2:35:55 PM
      108  MIGRACIONES INTERNACIONALES, VOL. 4, NÚM. 1, ENERO-JUNIO DE 2007
will determine the political profile of the links between immigration 
and identity in the archipelago.
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